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Abstract. The essay deals with the debates in Hungary concerning economic law at the 
beginning of the 1950s. At the time when socialist law penetrated into Hungary, many 
raised the issue whether economic law could be the adequate branch of law in socialist 
law. However, as the concept of economic law was defeated in the Soviet Union at the 
late 1930s, economic law could not be carried on even in Hungary. The essay provides a 
survey of the fights concerning Hungarian economic law, with special regard to the 
works of Gyula Eörsi.  
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I. 
 
It is not my purpose here to expound, neither in an international nor in a 
Hungarian perspective, the history of the ideological debate about ‘economic 
law’, undoubtedly the keenest debate in the history of socialist law which 
had even tragic consequences. 
 I seek to expose how Gyula Eörsi, unquestionably the greatest Hungarian 
civilist of his age, arrived from the initial strong opposition—through the 
ingenious idea of the ‘internal and external complexity of law’, to mention 
it in advance—to the de facto recognition of economic law without having 
to give up his former theoretical position in any respect. 
 As human views and scientific propositions cannot be understood without 
knowing the context: the given age, its atmosphere and the consequential 
concrete events, at the beginning I shall briefly deal with the character of 
Hungarian legislation and legal literature in the years after liberation in 
1945, the fall of the theory of economic law (which in my view didn’t 
even exist), the cause and origin of this fall, and the history of this subject 
at the end of the thirties in the Soviet Union. 
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 The history of the formation and fall of Soviet ‘economic law’ is presented 
in detail in Contribution to the Theory of Enterprise Law by Tamás Sárközy, 
so I don’t need to touch upon the topic even in a general perspective. 
 On the basis of contemporary legal literature and my personal remem-
brance I would remark that ‘economic law’, as formed in the Weimar era and 
continued under Hitler in Germany or as established in the Soviet Union 
in the 1920’s was in this sense non-existent in Hungary. 
 There hasn’t been any Hungarian theory of economic law (the only 
exception will be treated below) in spite of the use of the term. The term 
referred to economically relevant positive law on the one hand and the 
literature interpreting this legal material for legal professionals and the non-
lawyer economic specialists on the other. 
 It is well known and a commonplace that in 1945 Hungary inherited 
a destroyed economy and a severe inflation. Using the phrase of the time, 
economic reconstruction was then the crucial link in the chain. This 
reconstruction, as well as the execution of agrarian reform needed a great-
scale legislation. The problems of the ‘abandoned goods’ waited for solution 
too, to cite only one example from the long list. The work of reconstruction 
was linked to the introduction of socialism, initiated already in 1946 with 
the nationalisation of big banks. It is clear that the focus of legal literature 
was directed on this topic. Not only the articles of legal journals but also 
books concentrated on the subject, and after 1947 monographs appeared one 
after the other dealing with the regulation of the economy, with the term 
‘economic law’ in their title in some form. From 1947–48 on these books 
and articles referred to the socialist character of the legal material. 
 However, these books were handbooks without any dogmatics. In any 
case, there couldn’t have been any dogmatics in them, because it simply 
didn’t exist. 
  The need for these works has been later (after 1951 when the witch-
hunt abated) recognised even by the opponents of economic law, moreover 
their re-edition has been urged (they didn’t appear for a long time after the 
end of forties). 
 In 1948 the Hungarian Lawyers’ Association was formed through the uni-
fication of several organisation of lawyers. On this occasion a great inter-
national conference was held in Hévíz with the participation of foreign 
delegations. As usual, the conference worked in sections and of course there 
was also a section for economic law. A Soviet delegation participated at the 
conference too. The leader of this delegation, Professor Manjkovsky took 
notice from the programme with surprise that there was a section for 
economic law and pointed out to the organisers of the conference and to the 
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participating leaders of legal life that economic law was rejected in the 
Soviet Union at the end of thirties as a Trotskyte and anti-socialist tendency. 
 It needed a piece of time for his warning to begin to take effect. In 
1949 and 1950 the term ‘economic law’ was still used in Hungarian legal 
literature. Moreover, in 1950 Miklós Világhy held a lecture in the Lawyers’ 
Association with the title Our Constitution and Economic Law.1 In his 

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 The principal statements of his lecture were the following: 
 “Our Constitution certainly expresses and fixes the achievements of the development 
of economic law, determines the foundations of economic law and marks the main 
trends of future development as well. Which are these foundations and trends? 
 a) According to section 4 paragraph 1 of our Constitution, in the People’s Republic of 
Hungary the bulk of the productive assets is in public ownership. Though productive 
assets may be hold by private persons, the working people—continues paragraph 2 of 
the aforementioned section—gradually displaces capitalistic elements and steadily builds 
the socialist economic order. 
 From these stipulations of our Constitution we have to draw two conclusions 
regarding the material of economic law. The first conclusion  is that in the structure of our 
national economy, those enterprises and other organisational forms that hold each a group 
of the publicly owned productive assets came to have a determinative weight. 
 The second conclusion is that among the rules governing the operation of people’s 
economy, the process of social economic administration, those which regulate public 
enterprises, or in general the operation, production and trade performed by the units of 
public economy, predominate and gain more and more ground. 
 After the detailed examination of the relation between the constitution and 
economic law, finally we have to ask the question again: what gives the importance of the 
constitution for economic law. In the introduction we have answered that the constitution, 
among others,  summarises the main directions for the development of economic law 
in the people’s democracy. It is evident that now, after the detailed analysis we have 
a more precise answer. Along the detailed analysis we have seen that in the field of 
organisational law the development of economic law of the people’s democracy brought 
about the establishment of the basic principles of socialist enterprise organisation, and the 
development is expected to continue in the same direction. In the law of exchange, the 
result of development is the emergence of the main legal guarantees of socialist plan 
discipline and the legal regulation of the contract of delivery. We have seen in the 
law of co-operatives that our legal system is on the way toward the realisation of the 
different forms of socialist-type co-operatives. Finally, in labour law, we have stated 
that the constitution declares the basic principles of socialist labour law and determines its 
main safeguards as well. The economic law of our people’s democracy is today of 
socialist type not only through its character but, for the most part, on the crucial 
points it has developed to socialist economic law regarding its content and the origin 
of its rules too. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Hungary reflects this 
economic law of socialist content, summarises the achievements of its development, 
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monograph of 1951 entitled The Problem of Economic Law, written in the 
spirit of the era but with a very high professional legal culture, he rejected 
economic law and went as far as to call out for the banishment of economic 
law from the education of non-lawyer economic specialists. 
 At the end of 1950 was published the Hungarian translation of Visinsky’s 
The Problems of Soviet Legal and Political Science, which rejected economic 
law declaring it Trotskyte and anti-socialist. 
 The Committee for Legal and Political Science of the Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences put the question of economic law on the agenda. 
 During the debate on economic law, not limited to the Committee for 
Legal and Political Science of HAS, there were only some persons to hold 
aloft the banner of socialist economic law, already with knowledge of the 
antecedents in the Soviet Union. Among them was György Vadas, the first 
deputy-director of the Institute of Legal and Political Science of HAS, who 
paid for his deed not only with his position at the Institute but also with his 
scientific carrier. During the debate, Vadas explained: it is possible that 
they have chosen a bad name for the subject analysed in their books but it is 
not identical neither to German imperialist nor to so-called “Trotskyte” 
Soviet economic law. 
 Following the resolution of the Committee for Legal and Political Science 
of HAS which rejected economic law, was published Miklós Világhy’s 
monograph The Problem of Economic Law. This work, using the phraseology 
of the day but reflecting the fine legal culture of the author, analysed the 
problematics of economic law in six chapters, from the beginnings of 
commercial law in Europe to the critique of the Hungarian theory of economic 
law (which theory, in my view, did not exist). The author stressed with 
                                                                                                                                               
and marks the main trends of the further development. This is the essence and 
importance of the relation of the constitution and economic law. 
 b) According to Section 5 of our Constitution, the economic life of the Hungarian 
People’s Republic is determined by the national economic plan. 
 From this stipulation of our Constitution, we can draw again two conclusions 
regarding the material of economic law. The first states that due to the development 
in the last few years, the material of our economic law has been broadened by the 
rules regulating the determination of the national economic plan and the planned 
operation of the economy. This broadening is not only a simple increase in quantity 
but—and this is our second conclusion—a qualitative change too. The centre of gravity of 
exchange law, law of production and trade of goods is no more the material of trade 
transactions, commercial sale, consignment, shipment and other so-called commercial 
transactions.” Világhy, M.: Alkotmányunk és a gazdasági jog (Our Constitution and 
Economic Law). Budapest, 1950. 
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emphasis that the scholars of Hungarian economic law (among them the 
author himself with his co-authored secondary school textbook in 1949, his 
articles and lectures) can be identified subjectively neither with the scholars 
of German imperialist economic law nor with mischievous Soviet economic 
lawyers, the subject of their scholarly work, however, objectively leads to 
the destruction of the socialist legal system.2 
 In his monograph, representing the culmination of the campaign against 
economic law, Miklós Világhy divides the (not too voluminous) literature 
on economic law in groups according to the year of publication (1948, 1949, 
1950) and a bit forcibly refers to some qualitative differences among them. 
Namely 
 1948: the beginning of the theory of economic law, 
 1949: the accomplishment of the theory of economic law, 
 1950: the appearance of fully-fledged socialist theory of economic law. 

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 Világhy summarises his charges against the Hungarian “theory” of economic 
law as follows: 
 a) The question of economic law is primarily not a problem about the legal 
system but for the most part, a question about the character of the popular democratic 
law and state, about the soundness of the general views on the popular democratic law and 
state. The Hungarian theory of economic law made serious mistakes in this respect, 
since 
 aa) it supposed that there are parts of different character, of different class 
content within our popular democratic system of law, 
 bb) did not recognise the position of the individual in the socialist state, 
especially the inseparable linkage of socialist forms of ownership and it set socialist 
state and its economy against the individual citizen. 
 b) Economic law is secondarily also a question of the socialist legal system. The 
Hungarian economic law theory made a serious mistake when it endeavoured to unite the 
legal rules on economy in a separate branch of law, because 
 aa) in this way it separated certain groups of pecuniary relations of the socialist 
society from other groups of pecuniary relations, 
 bb) mutilated these pecuniary relations through the exclusion of property and 
consumption, 
 cc) the enlargement of the material of economic law is ineffectual since it would 
result in a heterogeneous legal material without any unifying principle, 
 dd) the theory of economic law proceeded also wrongly by trying to set the material of 
economic law on the basis of political economy since in this way, it misrepresented the 
proper relation of basis to superstructure, especially legal superstructure, and gave a 
false account of the nature and the characteristics of the legal superstructure. Világhy, 
M.: A gazdasági jog problémája (The Problem of Economic Law). Magyar Jogász Szö-
vetség,  Budapest, 1951. 
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He states the following: the theory of economic law of 1950 declares itself 
self-consciously and decidedly a complete socialist theory, a representative 
of socialist legal science which endeavours consistently to apply the 
Marxist-Leninist scientific method.3 
 
 
II. 
 
There is only one theoretical statement in the history of Hungarian economic 
law after the liberation in 1945. György Vadas namely wrote in his work 
The Outlines of Economic Law, published in autumn 1950 the following: 
 “The material of our economic law is held together by the solid steelworks 
of socialist political economics. We cannot make serious mistakes, cannot 
loose touch with reality if we endeavour to cast light on the material of 
our economic law by the laws of political economics. [...] We strive to sum 
up our legal institutions according to the basic features of the political 
economics of socialism.”4 
 Gyula Eörsi joined the debate at this question of systematisation. In 
his article “Economic Law and Political Economy”, published in the November 
1951 issue of Jogtudományi Közlöny [Journal for Legal Science] and 
based on his contribution of 5 July, 1951 at the discussion on economic law 
in the Committee for Legal and Political Science of HAS, Eörsi refuted 
Vadas’ views. His main argument was that to treat the material of economic 

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 By 1950, the most important characteristics of this theory got fully mature. 
These characteristics are 
 — the conception that legal rules relating to social economy mount up to a 
separate self-contained branch of law, 
 — the view that economic law practically cuts through the material of a host of 
other branches of law, separating and embracing in itself every rule that has some 
linkage to economic life (e.g. the law of economic administration, the part of criminal law 
dealing with economic crimes, parts of procedural law that are closely related to 
economic life, the entire financial law, the entire labour law); so economic law 
appears indeed as an expansive branch of law which deprives other branches of their 
material, takes the air away from them. 
 — the view that the whole economic law, or at least its basic part reflects the main 
idea, the “regulating principle” of planificatedness, the opposition of planification 
and plan discipline to freedom of contract. (Világhy: ibid.)  
 
4
 Vadas Gy.: A gazdasági jog vázlata (The Outlines of Economic Law). Budapest, 
1950. 
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law in the system of political economics did not advance the presentation 
of the interrelation of basis and the material of economic law. 
 But Vadas was wrong in that he tried to squeeze the material of 
economic law, being in close connection to the economic basis, in the 
system of political economics that is treating with this basis. The economic 
basis is the basis indeed but political economics is nothing else but a 
system of views: a superstructure. 
 The material of economic law cannot be separated from other legal 
material and transposed in the system of political economics because law, 
the entire legal system is an autonomous (though not independent) system. 
 Eörsi’s view is different from the view of Világhy and the Soviet 
literature against economic law in that he does not hold economic law for 
‘expansive law’: 
 “It does not follow from the aforesaid that economic law should be 
expansive and should divert the law of ownership from private law. As I 
mentioned in one of my previous articles, it follows rather that as the so 
called economic law is devoid of the basis, treated in private law, the 
autonomy of the so called economic law should be terminated and the 
appropriate part of economic law should be incorporated in private law.”5 
 Practising economic specialists and the main part of legal professionals 
concerned by the material of economic law did not have any idea of this 
debate on economic law. The more interested and qualified lawyers working 
in the 1950’s of economy were at a loss toward the debate. In the first half 
of the fifties, after Világhy’s book, written with fine legal culture but still 
blowing the icy wind of witch-hunt, they remained numb and silent. Later 
they only smiled and considered the whole debate as a university fight of 
legal theorists around professorships. That is, they did not understand why 
economic law cannot be a mixed branch of law if labour law does; what is 
the reason for the autonomy of land law and the law of agricultural co-
operatives as a branch of law (not only as a separate university field of 
study) while economic law is not an autonomous branch of law, not even a 
main course at the university. To be sure, later on several special courses 
were dealing with economic law both within the field of private and 
administrative law but to avoid to “fall into sin”, to call a spade, they 
were held under different intricate titles, specially as long as Világhy still 
had word and influence in university education. 

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 Eörsi, Gy.: Gazdasági jog és politikai gazdaságtan (Economic Law and Political 
Economics). Jogtudományi Közlöny VI 1951 No. 11, 671–675.  
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 The rather unilateral 1951 debate was followed by a long during 
silence. The problem of economic law scarcely came into question in the 
literature until the preparations of the 1968 reform of economic adminis-
tration. 
 After the death of Stalin the study of economic law recommenced in 
the GDR and Czechoslovakia and in the latter even an Economic Code 
was introduced. This was reflected in the Hungarian legal literature at the 
beginning of the sixties as Mihály Samu treated the recognition of the 
autonomy of economic law sympathetically in his monograph on the structure 
of the legal system and several civilists, including Gyula Eörsi though 
continued to reject economic law but already on the basis of cool pro-
fessional arguments, wholly devoid of witch-hunt. 
 In 1967, the last preparation year before the economic reform began a 
new debate on economic law on the columns of the journal Magyar Jog 
[Hungarian Law]. 
 Practising lawyers, among them Iván Meznerics, distinguished also as 
a theoretician, urged for the recognition of economic law, again not as 
calling for a separate dogmatics or a comprehensive code but as a demand 
for the recognition of the coherence and complexity of this field of law 
and especially of the adequate importance of economic law in the literature 
for practising lawyers as well as in the education. 
  At this time Eörsi reacted negatively to the demand for the recognition 
of economic law. I remember an (unpublished) impromptu contribution of 
his at a meeting, chaired by Rezs  Nyers, in which he answered to the 
contributions of economists calling for the recognition of economic law. 
He exposed that even if there might have been place for autonomous 
economic law in a system of economic administration based on breaking 
down the plan which was combining the method of administrative commands 
and civil contracts, there is no place for it in the new system of direction 
which reject the method of plan and breaking down and is based on the 
autonomous organising role of contracts. 
 Eörsi expounded his view systematically in his monograph On the Law 
of the Switch-over to a New System of Economic Administration, published 
in 1968. 
 In this work he does not mention yet internal and external complexity 
or the complex method but there appears the idea that the codification of 
private law shall be based on the specificities of the contract relations of 
socialist organisations and the specificities required by mass production 
shall be reflected in auxiliary acts, decrees and fundamental trading 
conditions of a complex character. 
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 “Thus our conclusion is that the ‘economic law oriented’ conception of 
codification which proposes an autonomous code, co-ordinated to the Civil 
Code is not the best method to regulate legal relations of the people’s 
economy. The same holds for the ‘commercial law oriented’ solution which 
equally urges a separate code for the regulation of legal relations of the 
people’s economy but in which the Civil Code would be the background law 
for this separate code. Against these two conceptions the conception of 
a unitary Civil Code shall be accepted, reorganised on the level of 
codification in the necessary measure according to the model of socialist 
organisations. The specificities deriving from the socialist character of the 
people’s economy and from mass production shall be reflected in auxiliary 
acts, government decrees and fundamental trading conditions of a complex 
character. This offers the required stability and mobility for the legal 
material of the people’s economy. However, it is evident that an economic 
code is in no way more mobile than the civil code.”6 
 The reason for Eörsi to reject economic law was invariably his persistent 
view that the systematic division of law shall rest on legal and not directly 
on economic reality. 
 The system of law cannot be built directly on economic reality. Though in 
the last resort determined by economy, law is a relatively independent 
system of views and institutions.7 
 “The difference between the traditional and the ‘economic law oriented’ 
conceptions lies not in that the traditional conception uses highly abstract 
concepts (property, legal person, contract etc.) as some representatives of 
economic law alleges, but in that the traditional socialist conception 
thinks in legal institutions while the socialist conception of economic law 
thinks in economic activities. So the latter reasoning is regrettably far too 
obvious within the circle of non-lawyers, among whom especially economists 
have an extremely great influence on decisions which irradiate to law as 
well. 
 It follows that such statements according to which the growth of economic 
law to a separate branch of law is the same phenomenon as the separation 
of labour law, the law of co-operatives or family law as independent branches 
of law, cannot be substantiated. In these we are dealing with small 
collectives; by this way the unity of social relations shows up clearly and 

 
6
 Eörsi, Gy.: A gazdaságirányítás új rendszerére való áttérés jogáról (On the law 
of the Switch-over to a New System of Economic Administration). Budapest, 1968. 
133. 
 
7
 Id. 88–89. 
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also unitary legal principles and methods come to existence, fitting to the 
relations of the small collective. But in the domain of economic law there 
is no such perspective because as Világhy pointed out, economic law does 
not embrace the economy; that’s why its boundaries can be laid out only 
arbitrarily.”8 
 Thus after all this said, we have to conclude that on the level of codifi-
cation, the most convenient solution, for this country too, is a single civil 
code. This solution on the level of codes implies also that, on the basis of 
codes, which are separated mainly according to legal branches, auxiliary 
acts, government decrees and fundamental trading conditions shall be 
created, to meet the requirement of complexity and greater variability.9 
 
 
III. 
 
Eörsi’s outstanding theory on “internal and external complexity” which 
was leading to the gradual recognition of economic law without retracting 
his former theoretical position was comprehensively expounded for the 
first time in 1972.10 
 Already in the introduction he is more indulgent toward the conception 
of economic law than the Hungarian literature till then. 
 “Present-day conceptions of economic law are based on a particular 
interpretation of economic determination and service role of law. They 
declare a certain scheme of economic activity for the backbone of the 
system of law, directly attach legal provisions to economic institutions, 
brings law ‘closer to the practice’. 
 So even the most determined opponents of economic law can not say 
that it is only about an infectious mistake.”11 
 Eörsi noted that the adherents of the conception of economic law and of 
civil law and administrative law were dealing with the same material. Their 
references were at variance not because they put different theoretical strait-
jackets on facts. The thing is that there was a difference between evaluations. 
For systematisation the first group emphasised economic structure, the second 

  
8
 Id. 32. 
  
9
 Id. 133. 
 
10
 Eörsi, Gy.: Küls  és bels  komplexitás. A gazdasági jog kérdéséhez (External 
and Internal Complexity. On the Question of Economic Law). Gazdaság és Jogtudo-
mány, MTA IX. Osztályának Közleményei. Budapest, 1972. 
 
11
 Id. 81. 
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accentuated legal institutions. The very close connection between state 
regulation of the economy and the administration of public property was 
clear for everyone. Some considered this fact as constituting branches of 
law, others did not, but both had a common purpose: more effective legal 
assistance for people’s economy and the society. 
 Eörsi sketched two models of the mechanism of people’s economy. 
The first-essentially the model of GDR—conceived the entire people’s 
economy as a single immense centrally operated “machinery”. The second-
essentially the Hungarian model—was a “system” achieving the dynamic 
equilibrium within a space regulated by the national economic plan. 
 In the “machinery” model legal elements constitute internal complexity, in 
the “system” model external complexity. 
 By internal complexity he means that legal units integrate elements 
which are heterogeneous from the perspective of legal function and method 
(e.g. elements of civil and administrative law)—this is the conception of 
economic law. External complexity means that legal institutions essentially 
retain their contour and branch-of-law specificities. The institutions of 
different branches of law operate together without dissolving, in a way 
that they maintain their functional and methodical characteristics. The 
“machinery” model is the hotbed of internal complexity (the economic 
law) because it essentially consists in the mingling of administrative and 
economic elements, i.e. administrative law and civil law. External complexity 
corresponds to the “system” model as it separates administrative and 
economic, i.e. administrative law and civil law elements. Internal complexity 
is reflected in the branches of law as the maintenance of the traditional 
socialist division of the legal system. 
 So, Eörsi relates the “machinery” model to the conception of internal 
complexity and economic law and the “system” model to the conception 
of external complexity. It is not the same as to link economic law to the 
planned economy with direct commands and the traditional socialist 
conception to indirect, decentralised systems, viz. to contend that the 
situation in socialist states before the reforms encourages economic law 
while the situation after reforms is favourable to the conception of external 
complexity. This view, which previously also Eörsi himself advocated, is 
to some extent simplifying and contradicts certain facts. It is very easy to 
grasp the system of direct plan commands by the conception of external 
complexity: this was the predominant practice in the law of European 
socialist states. It is not direct plan command system which is favourable 
to economic law but the “system” model, although, as we shall see, internal 
complexity, i.e. economic law leads almost by nature to the dominance of 
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centralism. Hence, the conceptions of internal and external complexity 
connect not with direct and indirect economic administration mechanisms 
but with “machinery” and “system” models. 
 One of the important differences between the two conception subsisting on 
this common ground is the following: The conception of internal complexity 
which realises staatliche Leistungspyramide, is conceived in a vertical cross-
section. Every relevant theoretical construction is built from the peak of 
central organs to the base, by its nature with a strong orientation toward 
central elements. Market can find a place in this construction only artificially 
as it would imply, within the conditions of socialism, the “system” instead 
of “machinery”. 
 In contrast, the conception of external complexity is neutral from the 
point of view of orientation. Within this conception vertical and horizontal 
cross-sections as well as the internal relations of firms and co-operatives 
can be distinguished. In this way a space is created within which the current 
economic administration may determine the place and importance of different 
elements. The conception of external complexity is equally apt for the 
service of a more centralised directive mechanism and a decentralised one 
with a considerable role for the regulated market. 
 The second important divergence of the two conceptions is essentially 
that they attach law to economy on different levels. 
 Of course, the conception of external complexity seeks to influence 
economic processes too but in this respect the conception of internal 
complexity is specific inasmuch as it directly adjusts the legal system to 
the regulation of the economic process. The machinery of staatliche 
Leistungspyramide
 needs to attach law to certain elements of the economic 
mechanism at a considerably lower level so that the autonomous system 
of law loses importance. There is no sense to think about institutions of 
law here. 
 In contrast, according to the conception of external complexity law 
serves the economic mechanism as a specifically legal system based on 
legal institutions, operates comprehensive legal abstractions and attaches 
great importance to the institutions of law. 
 The conception of internal complexity is a) linking the most divergent 
legal means to each element of the economy and in this way b) substitutes 
an economic system for the specific legal system, thinning away the legal 
element on a great scale. Often the writings on economic law can be hardly 
distinguished from practical economic works: instead of institutions of law 
they primarily deal with legal means attached to economic ends, methods 
and organisation. 
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 In contrast, the conception of external complexity considers the relative 
autonomy of law as a condition of the development of special, character-
istically legal means and so the more effective service of the economy; 
that is what the conception of internal complexity denies. 
 It involves, however, that the conception of internal complexity is 
hardly suitable for becoming the conception of codification since a code is 
characterised by the systematisation of a large area in law, i.e. it embraces 
law in a legal system. But, as explained, there is no much place for the legal 
system within the conception of internal complexity. It is due to this fact that 
in the country which enforces this conception the most consequently, the 
GDR, the great difficulties with the codification led at least temporarily to 
renounce to establish an economic code and to regulate the people’s economy 
on government level, through a fragmented and not a unitary system. Meanwhile 
the codification of the civil code was being continued. In Czechoslovakia the 
Economic Code was effectively an act on economy systematised according 
to the branches of the people’s economy. Under the title “general provisions” 
only 26 sections out of 400 comprised the provisions on the relations of 
direction. Other provisions were such that for the most part they could 
equally take place within a socialist civil law codification: 272 sections 
related to the law of obligations, all of them appertaining except for 43 
sections to the particular provisions of the law of obligations.12 
 In the final account, legal regulation of the people’s economy means 
the regulation of human activity, though it necessarily contains a great 
number of purely technical element. The legal element not only provides 
the official sanction for the economic element but transposes the ends 
posited and processes designed by economists and engineers. That is a not 
unimportant reason for the existence of law as a specific establishment, i.e. 
one which is not identical to its determinant, the economic system. This being 
granted, the “machinery” or “system” character of the economic mechanism 
orientates in different directions. The conception of internal complexity 
intended for the service of the “machinery” is dominated by the “regulation 
of processes”. In the conception of external conception, intended for the 
service of the “system” the “regulation of activities” is dominant. In turn, 
the prominence of the regulation of activities brings about the prominence 
of the legal system. 
 Eörsi points out two practical shortcomings of the conception of internal 
complexity. It does not take into account that civil law contracts need 
some common provisions, nor that a great number of contract types equally 
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apply for the public property sector and the personal property sector 
(credit, carriage, insurance, lease, deposit etc.). 
 The conception of economic law, however, cannot include the common 
provisions about contracts, only the provisions for those concluded between 
socialist organisations. 
 According to the conception of internal complexity the integrity, 
namely practical economic integrity is formed by the obligations of the 
people’s economy; contracts between socialist organisations and individuals 
or between individuals themselves are excluded. For the conception of 
external complexity, however, the unity is made out of all commodity-related 
obligations (which relate relatively autonomous parties) irrespective of 
subjects and sectors; this excludes in turn the systematic integrity with the 
obligations deriving from the relations of governmental economic direction 
and of intra-firm management. 
 The replacement of the legal system by a system based on the scheme 
of economic activity or organisation leads to split asunder institutions 
of law through the denial of systematising relevancy of high-order generali-
sations (socialist property law, contract of commodity or autonomous structure, 
responsibility etc.). The conception of internal complexity comes nearer to 
the everyday practice than the conception of external complexity does, 
both in the choice of its system, of the still useful level of generalisation 
and in the tendency of descending from the level of institutions of law to 
the level of legal rules. Before considering this as an absolute advance let 
us remind that the system nearest to the practice is that of the common 
law; it cannot see the wood for the trees, becomes pragmatist and remains 
in spheres that provide a natural medium for theoretical indifference. This 
of course does not hold for the conception of internal complexity; on the 
contrary, the manifestations in the GDR are the most ideological; but from 
a legal perspective, the result of these considerations come close to practicism 
because they tend to see in law nothing more than an administrative–
technical auxiliary device of the economic practice. 
 The final conclusion of the work is that the compilation and especially 
the codification of the entire legal material of the people’s economy is 
both unnecessary and impossible. It is unnecessary because nobody needs 
it in entirety. He who works as lawyer in the construction industry does 
not need the whole system of rules for internal commerce. It is also 
impossible because legal activity reaches back to general institutions 
overlapping the scope of economy (delay, invalidity, termination etc.). 
 While the conception of internal complexity commingles legal instruments 
at the outset and causes the sketched problems in theory, policy of law and 
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practice in this way, the key issue of the conception of external complexity is 
to find the suitable level, measure and method to junction the institutions 
of different branches of law in the different areas of legal work: legislation, 
jurisprudence and legal education etc. This is a practical problem in all 
these domains. 
 Different tools does not become similar as being used in the work on the 
same object: drill remains drill and hammer remains hammer. We have to 
manufacture and get the mastery of both tools separately but we have to apply 
them together. That is the essence of the conception of external complexity. 
 Thus in this work of Eörsi we cannot find the recognition of economic 
law even as a secondary branch of law or as a discipline. 
 In spite of this, Eörsi’s theory of internal and external complexity gave 
full satisfaction to the needs of lawyers working in different fields. These 
lawyers were repugnant and at a loss toward the debate about the 
qualification of economic law as a branch of law from the beginning. 
 They held for natural to unite legal institutions of the economy in a 
harmonic construction irrespective of their place within the branches of 
law. Eörsi’s theory, determining the content of external complexity satisfied 
this need. They considered this theory as the recognition of the coherent 
work in the different domains of economic law and of the unconditional 
necessity of this work. The debate on the rejection or recognition of the 
autonomy of this branch of law was looked upon, a bit sceptically as one 
about the establishment of another professorship. None of these lawyers 
raised a claim to duplicate the general part of the law of obligations as it 
was done in Czechoslovakia by framing the Economic Code. But they surely 
claimed for the recognition and the legislative expression of the specialities 
of economic contracts by the framing of an economic code. They used in 
this respect a trivial but sound argument: although the re-soling of a shoe 
and the complete construction of a nuclear power plant are both realised 
through a contract of enterprise there is a great difference both in the 
content and the legal characteristics of the two contracts. 
 After the reforms of 1968 Eörsi already accepted that by the regulation 
of the particular contract types in the Civil Code the requirements of the 
contracts important for the people’s economy shall be taken into account 
as rules and the contracts for mere consumption shall be reckoned with 
when determining the exceptions. 
 Why did the theory of internal and external complexity satisfy the needs 
of legal practitioners? 
 1. A practising lawyer is cognisant of the importance of the limits 
between criminal law and civil law, substantive law and procedural law, 
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recognises the speciality of political law as a separate branch of law in the 
conditions of socialism but beyond that he does not care about the 
division of branches of law. For him it is indifferent whether law reflects the 
economy by internal complexity, i.e. by an autonomous branch of law or by 
external complexity i.e. by the harmony of institutions of law established 
within separate branches of law. 
 2. They needed an accord among different legal institutions of the 
economy, that the important gaps of law shall not be filled or the collision 
of legal rules within different branches of law shall not be resolved by the 
practice. The theory fulfilled this need. 
 3. This theory recognised also in civil law the dominance of economic 
phenomena by the formation of principal rules. 
 The theory of complexity allowed for the silent, orderly and peaceful 
retreat of legal theoreticians in this stormy question. 
 In my view the theory of complexity was, even before its full exposition 
in 1977, a de facto recognition of economic law without theoretical 
retreat. That makes the theory ingenious. 
 
 
IV. 
 
The further development of the theory of internal and external complexity 
is due to a further advance on the way of de facto recognition of economic 
law. Eörsi’s last monographic work, Law, Economy and the Structure of the 
Legal System
 was published in 1977.13 
 As a point of departure he made a remark on the relation of law and 
extra-legal social phenomena. Law always regulates social relationships 
which do not respect its system. That lies behind the enchantedness of law, as 
Imre Szabó expressed it. However, the intensity of the state-controlled 
plan economy pushed this problem to the extremes. Instead of the regulation 
of behaviour, norms relating to the economy contain regulations characterised 
by the enumeration of a great number of parameters. 
 “The structure of the legal system unites the internal and external 
aspects of law in a self-referring manner with respect to the structure of 
the special legal sphere: in reality we are dealing with the organisation of 
the ‘external’ (socio-economic relations) into a heterogeneous ‘internal’ 
system (the law). From the point of view of the special characteristics of 
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law, the legal system shall be, as we will treat it at length, a closed system 
of logic, while a branch of law shall form a legally regulated complex of 
socio-economic relations into a sub-system. Thus, the type of socio-economic 
relations and the legal regulation, i.e. the ‘external’ and the ‘internal’, the 
social and the legal aspects are equally important for us. It is quite obvious 
that economic law, for instance takes into consideration only the first 
aspect. What concerns the specifically legal element, there is a danger 
here, that of legal formalism which may lead to a mere logical system. It 
can be avoided by not isolating the specifically legal element, as law 
cannot be isolated from the subject it refers to. Law shall be considered as 
determined by society in order to bring to bear its social effects in an 
optimal way. Thus the specific character and mechanism of law come into 
prominence. Socio-economic relations, otherwise groupable in a number 
of ways, shall be sorted into branches of law according to their identical 
or similar legal character and mechanism. That’s what law as a specific 
objectivation requires and the character of these socio-economic relations 
itself plays an important role in the grouping.”14 
 The structure of the legal system is thus given by the dialectics of 
socio-economic relations and the specific legal method. Based on this, the 
arrangement is determined by this pair of phenomena as filtered by cognitive 
and volitional media of legislation and jurisprudence and as finally expressed 
across certain fractures. 
 The traditional theorem which says that the structure of the legal system 
is divided on the basis of certain groups of social relations and specific 
legal methods, is not exact entirely. These two are not joined together by 
an ‘and’, because in real these are the external and internal side of the 
same thing. Although on the final account social relations determine law, 
the way it happens will substantially depend on the specificities of law, i.e. 
the methods which are available. From an external perspective the social 
relations are determinant, from an internal view, the legal methods. The 
social relation can determine the structure of the legal system on the final 
grade only by “putting on the dress of law”, by adapting to legal specificities. 
 Eörsi drew a difference between the structure and the division of the 
legal system: 
 “Beyond the aforementioned double determinant of its structure, the 
division of the legal system is specified by every social or individual 
factor which determine how the effectual ‘dividers’ of the legal system 
express the needs of the legal system. 
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 There are three determinants of the final result, of which the first two 
appear from the beginning as inseparably interrelated: 
 a) The final basis of the structure of the legal system lies in the socio-
economic relations. 
 b) A social fact becomes legal fact only by integrating in the legal 
complex. This complex, however cannot ‘smack itself on the face’, social 
facts have to be ‘transcribed’ in law according to the functions of law in 
compliance with the interests of the ruling class. These functions require 
the transformation of the social facts into teleological propositions of a 
concrete practical program. The relatively autonomous regularities of law 
formed in this way specify the integration of social facts in the system of 
law, and, in turn specify the second determinative element of the structure 
of the legal system, permanently leading to contradictions. 
 c) The expression of law is not exempt of the intrigues of false con-
sciousness, i.e. the expression of law may be ‘good or bad’. At this point, 
deformations may be brought about by elements which are accidental from 
the perspective of the legal system but well determined on another line. This 
third determinative element relating to the division of the legal system is 
nothing else but the inadequate expression deriving from the above-
mentioned transcription.”15 
 Eörsi put the question whether the scientific–technical revolution makes 
the theoretical conception about the necessity of the division of law into 
homogeneous branches needless. Modern western pragmatism takes the 
distinction between branch of law and discipline for unnecessary because it 
does not hold for important whether a branch of law consists of homo-
geneous institutions of law. 
 The dogmatic conception of the division of branches of law resulted also 
in the remission of the entire division problem into the mere practice. 
 Finally, Eörsi concluded that the tension between the structure of the 
relations to be regulated and the structure of the legal system was increasing 
because socio-economic relations become more and more complex. This 
fact influences but does not eliminate the requirement that the legal system 
should have a structure suitable to its own regularities. This influence consists 
in the formation of quasi-branches of law which are still founded on genuine 
branches of law based on legal homogeneity. 
 Eörsi’s final conclusion, the summit of the development of the theory 
of complexity is the following: 
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  “However, beside branches of law the socialist conception recognises 
fields of law—usually called disciplines, but it is perhaps better to reserve 
the expression ‘discipline’ for a category of education and to speak here 
about quasi-branches of law—which form a unit from political or practical 
point of view without being branches of law. From a legal point of view these 
are characterised by internal complexity: they organise legally hetero-
geneous elements around a circumscribed socio-economic purpose. This 
conception subsisted especially about the legally heterogeneous land law. 
Furthermore, many regarded the law of agricultural co-operatives (which 
does not include every co-operative nor the entire agriculture) as such a 
field. Environmental law etc. may grow to such quasi-branches too. 
 In this way, according to the socialist conception, law is primarily divided 
into legally homogeneous branches of law on an objective basis and 
secondarily, so to say “under the branches of law” it mixes the tools and 
methods of different branches, establishes legally heterogeneous complex 
domains or cuts out legal fields to unite certain complexes of relations for 
practical purposes, irrespective of the requirement of the legal homogeneity of 
the system. The system of legislation corresponds to this conception as it 
unites, although not in their entirety, the branches of law in principal codes, 
supplementing it by the complex regulation of certain fields of law.”16 
 We have accompanied Gyula Eörsi, the greatest Hungarian civilist of the 
second half of the twentieth century along his way, clearly not free of internal 
struggle, dealing with the recognition of economic law until he arrived to reconcile 
the purity of his theoretical views with the manifest serious requirements of 
the social practice. He was able to do that without need to recant his former 
views. He did not have to do so because he had not taken part in the witch-
hunt at the beginning of the 1950’s, even if he had not “compromised himself” 
with works on economic law. His views and debating manners were all along 
resolute but conciliatory to the opposing views at the same time. 
 It is not my duty to evaluate his oeuvre here. I would not even entertain it. 
First, being without an aptitude for it and second because, owing to our sixty-
year-long friendship started at the school-bench I miss the necessary 
impartiality to do that. But I can undoubtedly assert that his magnificent 
oeuvre contains some works (e.g. his theory of responsibility) which are 
more important than the ones reviewed here. But still these certify his 
great factual knowledge and legal creativity. 
 Eörsi’s oeuvre was regrettably interrupted too much early. Within the field 
of the law of economy it was for his disciples to continue and accomplish it. 
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